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This  study  attempts  to  provide  an  alternative  methodology  to 
calculate the  horizontal equalization transfers. This methodology 
follows  the  Australian  horizontal  equalization  principle  using  a 
panel  model  methodology  where  both  revenue  and  expenditure 
side  considerations  are  involved.  First,  it  applies  the  Canadian 
model  in  calculating  the  fiscal  capacity  equalization.  Then  the 
expenditure side equalization has been carried out for two services 
- education and health. Results of the exercise indicate that the 
transfers suggested by the panel model are more progressive than 

















Inter-State Disparities in India 
As compared to countries like Australia or Canada where the ratio of the 
highest per capita Gross State Product (GSP) to lowest per capita GSP 
among states is only around 1.5 and 1.9 (per capita GDP) respectively 
the corresponding ratio for India is as high as 9 (when Goa is included) 
and close to 6 when Goa is excluded.  
 
In  order  to  deal  with  this  problem,  the  Constitution  and  the 
Indian  government  have  made  several  arrangements,  including  fiscal 
transfers  to  different  states  according  to  the  needs  perceived  by  the 
government.  In  India,  Finance  Commission  is  the  body  that  has  been 
constitutionally assigned the task of determining transfers in the form of 
tax  devolution  under  global  tax  sharing  and  grants.  The  Finance 
Commission  transfers  are  supplemented  by  the  Planning  Commission 
grants  and  other  discretionary  grants  determined  by  the  central 
government.  The  approach  pursued  by  the  Finance  Commission  in 
deciding  transfers  is  normative  only  to  a  limited  extent.  Equalization 
transfers aim at providing citizens of every state a comparable standard 
of  services  provided  their  revenue  effort  is  also  comparable.  In  other 
words, equalization transfers neutralize deficiency in fiscal capacity but 
not in revenue effort. The horizontal dimension of transfers given by TFC 
asserts “If, in per capita terms, all states were similar in fiscal capacities 
and cost conditions, the equalization criterion would be met by equal per 
capita transfers.” But in practice it is seen that one-third of the deficiency 
in revenue effort of the states is also covered up by the transfers. This 
partial gap-filling approach creates a potential adverse incentive among 
states. In addition to this, the cost conditions are only partially equalized. 





Table 1: Per Capita Expenditure on General, Economic and Social 
Services (Average Over 2004-05 to 2006-07) 
              (Rupees) 
 States  GEN  SOC  ECO  EDN  HTH  WSS 
Bihar   283  751  334  473  85  25 
Uttar Pradesh  302  892  449  492  118  28 
Madhya Pradesh  418  1020  722  456  128  48 
Rajasthan  324  1296  787  725  160  142 
Assam  622  1736  957  1035  173  99 
Orissa  323  1238  575  590  126  70 
West Bengal   341  1201  519  671  159  30 
Andhra Pradesh  401  1635  1197  703  170  87 
Karnataka  792  1703  1416  898  183  40 
Tamil Nadu  545  1841  984  845  193  18 
Kerala  635  2024  1050  1168  290  92 
Gujarat  342  1595  1137  771  163  45 
Punjab  2031  1523  1542  910  244  87 
Maharashtra   936  1971  757  1070  189  140 
Haryana  653  1718  1967  861  165  152 
Coeff of Variation  74.3  26.5  46.5  28.3  29.4  61.3 
Min/Max  0.14  0.37  0.17  0.39  0.29  0.12 
Min/Mean  0.47  0.51  0.35  0.59  0.50  0.25 
Source:  State Finance Accounts, various years. 
Key:      GEN = General services excluding interest payments and pensions. 
SOC:      Social services; ECO: Economic services; EDN=Education; HTH=Health;  
             WSS= Water supply and sanitation. 
 
Table  1  shows  the  per  capita  average  state  government 
expenditures over the period 2004-05 to 2006-07 in general, social and 
economic services. The larger states are considered here focusing on the 
general  category  states  except  Goa  but  including  Assam.  The  Table 
exhibits a wide gap between the states with the highest and lowest per 
capita expenditures. This emphasizes the dire need to reform the transfer 
system so that the aim of horizontal fiscal equalization can be achieved.  
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The  Canadian  and  the  Australian  vertical  transfer  systems  have  been 
considered in this regard.  States are arranged in increasing order of per 
capita GSDP; for 2006-07 revised estimates have been considered. 
 
In  the  Canadian  constitution  the  principle  of  equalization 
transfers  is  stated  as  “principle  of  making  equalization  payments  to 
ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide 
reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably comparable 
levels of taxation”. The Australian equalization differs from the Canadian 
equalization due to the reference to efficiency and standard of services. 
The  Canadian  system  makes  reference  only  to  equalization  in  fiscal 
capacity. In Australia, fiscal equalization looks at both the revenue and 
expenditure sides.  
 
The Australian model is relevant to India because many states 
incur  higher  costs  in  delivering  services  owing  to  reasons  which  are 
beyond their control. So it becomes essential to compensate such states 
and  help  them  reach  the  average  level  of  services  offered  by  other 
states.  Neglecting  a  problem  like  this  one  could  result  in  regional 
imbalance in publicly provided goods and services which can lead to high 
rate of fiscally induced migration of people to high income areas putting 
pressure on the local government. Though some consideration is given to 
cost  disabilities  in  India  by  giving  weightage  to  factors  like  area  and 
infrastructure,  what  is  needed  is  separating  exogenous  and  structural 
disabilities from policy-induced disabilities and treating it. 
 
Objectives of the Study  
This paper examines central transfers to states in India by applying the 
Australian fiscal transfer system of revenue and expenditure equalization. 
It also takes in to account the effect of disabilities  in the expenditure 
assessment.  Disabilities  can  be  categorized  into  two  broad  types- 
structural and exogenous disabilities; and policy-induced disabilities.  
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Overview of Literature 
The  Australian  fiscal  transfer  system  is  one  of  the  oldest  and  most 
appreciated systems in the world. The Australian federation comprises of 
six  states-  Queensland,  New  South  Wales  (NSW),  Southern  Australia 
(SA), Victoria, Western Australia (WA) and Tasmania. In addition, there 
are two territorial administrations, viz, the Northern Territories (NT) and 
the  Australian  Capital  Territory  (ACT).  Though  the  federation  is 
characterized by a high degree of vertical imbalance in its fiscal structure, 
which  has  only  increased  after  the  introduction  of  the  comprehensive 
Goods and Services Tax (GST), great emphasis is laid on horizontal fiscal 
equalization.  Various  Special  Purpose  Payments  (SPPs)  are  also  a 
significant component of the system. The uniqueness of the Australian 
system of fiscal transfers is horizontal fiscal equalization (HFE) that looks 
into  both  revenue  and  expenditure  sides  of  the  state  budgets  and 
calculates  revenue  and  expenditure  „disabilities‟  that  account  for 
departures  from  a  pure  equal  per  capita  distribution  of  the  shareable 
amounts. In the system the terms “relativities” and “disabilities” are used 
instead of the commonly adopted “state shares”.  
 
In  their  analysis  of  relevance  of  Australian  model  to  India, 
Rangarajan  and  Srivastava  (2004)  have  summarized  some  of  the 
important differences, similarities, and essential lessons in respect of the 
vertical  and  horizontal  dimensions  of  transfers.  The  significant 
conclusions they arrived at are as follows: 
(a) The Australian system is characterized by a high degree of vertical 
imbalance and centralisation of expenditure. In raising revenues, 
the Indian system is also characterized by high vertical imbalance 
but somewhat lower than that in Australia. Also, centralisation of 
expenditure after transfers in Australia is higher than that in India. 
This makes Australian model more apt for India. 
(b)  India has some institutional advantage over the Australian system 
in that it can control the vertical transfer, which gets automatically  
 
5 
determined  in  Australia,  and,  therefore,  utilize  the  system  more 
optimally. 
(c)  The important concept which they emphasized should be borrowed 
from  the  Australian  system  is  their  idea  of  equalization.  The 
Australian  equalization  payments  are  based  on  explicit  principles 
that  aim  at  enabling  states  to  provide  its  citizens  services  at 
comparable  standards  if  they  are  willing  to  make  comparable 
revenue efforts and are able to operate at comparable levels of 
efficiency.   Rather than a gap-filling approach, an approach 
which equalizes the fiscal capacity of the states should be followed. 
They  suggest  considering  a  macro  base  for  revenue  side 
equalization and focus expenditure equalization in respect of select 
services  where  mobility  is  limited.  This  suggestion  has  been 
adopted as the approach in this paper. 
(d) An important feature of the Australian system is its emphasis on 
cost  disabilities.  In  India,  some  consideration  is  given  to  cost 
disabilities  through  incorporation  of  factors  such  as  area  and 
infrastructure in the devolution formula. The emphasis has to be on 
neutralizing  structural  and  exogenous  cost  disabilities.  Correcting 
policy-induced  cost  disabilities  may  lead  to  a  loss  in  efficiency. 
Separating one from the other is however a difficult task. 
(e) The rolling forward method of the Australian system can help India 
in  a  more  efficient  allocation  by  taking  into  account  the  latest 
status of the states. 
(f)  The working of loan council has relevance for India as it would help 
in  ensuring  macroeconomic  stability  and  bring  about  fiscal 
discipline 
 
In this direction the twelfth finance  commission suggested the 
centre to remove the loan component from the grants given to the states 
by the Planning Commission and encourage the states to borrow from  
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the market according to their own capacity and the centre has agreed to 
consider the recommendation.  
 
However,  the  efficiency  of  the  Australian  system  has  been 
questioned  by  many  economists.  The  issue  of  efficiency  in  federal 
arrangements can be considered in terms of whether decentralization of 
expenditure  is  efficiency  augmenting,  and  if  that  is  so,  whether 
equalization  transfers  help  promote  efficiency  of  the  sub-national 
governments.  In  the  general  literature  on  efficiency  implications  of 
decentralization  [e  g,  Oates  1972],  the  source  of  efficiency  is  traced 
mainly either to the possibility of non-uniform provision of local public 
goods based on lower signaling costs of local preferences or to greater 
competition among jurisdictions [Breton 1996]. In both cases, however, a 
variety of decentralisation failures [Prud‟homme 1995: Breton 2002] may 
constrain  the  efficiency-augmenting  effects.  Some  of  the  cases  of 
decentralisation  failure  listed,  for  example,  in  Breton  (2002)  relate  to 
costs  of  information,  political  participation  costs,  coordination  costs, 
diminishing supply costs, and dynamic instability arising from unhealthy 
„race  to  bottom‟  type  competition.  In  their  Review  of  Commonwealth-
state Funding, Garnaut and FitzGerald (2002) have summarised in their 
Final Report several types of efficiency-reducing effects of the transfer 
arrangements in Australia. They argue that equalising transfers tend to: 
(i)  reduce  the  incentives  for  resources  to  locate  in  higher  productivity 
locations;  (ii)  reduce  the  capacity  for  investment  in  human  resource 
development in low productivity regions to enhance national economic 
potential; (iii) increase the overhead and transactions costs of managing 
the system; (iv) discourages the attraction and retention of high-value 
mobile resources in an international market; (v) leads to duplication, lack 
of co-ordination and game playing by officials; (vi) unduly enlarges the 
role  of  the  public  sector;  (vii)  encourages  grant-seeking  behaviour, 
particularly  where  states  have  the  capacity  to  influence  the  CGC‟s 
assessed  standard  budget;  (viii)  dilutes  incentives  for  cost  reducing 
reforms; and (ix) discourages growth promoting policies if the benefits of  
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growth are mostly transferred to others. They observe that most of these 
efficiency  reducing  effects  arise  from  the  expenditure  side  of 
equalization.  By  compensating  for  the  disabilities  they  discourage  the 
movement  of  people  out  of  high  cost  regions.  He  found  that  the 
provinces which were receiving higher transfers had bigger public sector 
and a tiny private sector, a situation not very conducive to growth. 
 
The  theoretical  literature  on  equalisation,  particularly  the 
contributions by Buchanan (1950), Scott (1950), Buchanan and Wagner 
(1971), Graham(1964), Gramlich (1985), and Mathews (1993) has looked 
at  the  issue  of  the  implications  of  equalization,  especially  expenditure 
side equalisation on efficiency in detail. While Scott had argued way back 
in 1950 that equalisation is detrimental to efficiency because it impedes 
mobility of factors of production to locations where they would be most 
productive, Buchanan and Wagner have argued that efficiency would be 
impeded if migration is fiscally induced by states providing more public 
goods  at  lower  tax  costs.  They  argued  that  rich  states  could  induce 
migration by providing higher net fiscal benefit but, eventually due to the 
existence of congestible goods, the net fiscal benefit would fall. As too 
many  people  migrate  to  the  richer  states,  there  would  be  a  loss  of 
efficiency in the economy as a whole. This incentive towards excessive 
migration  in  their  view  ought  to  be  neutralized  through  fiscal 
equalization. Under these circumstances, equalization is consistent with 
equity and efficiency. 
    
Grewal  and  Mathews  (1983)  showed  that  locational  choice  is 
usually influenced by private production and consumption activities rather 
than by fiscal and other activities of the governments. While there may 
be a case for making transfers taking into account cost disabilities due to 
structural and exogenous factors, policy-induced disabilities should not be 
neutralized. However, in practice, it is often difficult to separate one from 
the other and measure their impact.  
 
8 
Equalization Transfers: Some Concepts 
A good understanding of the following concepts is required in order to 
study the Australian methodology.   
(1)  Principle  of  fiscal  equalization:    The  most  recent  definition  of  the 
principle of fiscal equalization is as follows: 
“State governments should receive funding from the pool of goods 
and services, tax revenue and health care grants such that, if each 
made  the  same  effort  to  raise  revenue  from  its  own  sources  and 
operated  at  the  same  level  of  efficiency,  each  would  have  the 
capacity to provide services at the same standard.” 
The definition makes it clear that it is the fiscal capacity of the states 
that  is  being  equalized.  Fiscal  equalization  is  not  directed  towards 
equalization  of  the  circumstances  of  individuals,  households  or 
communities. 
The  implementation  of  the  equalization  principle  rests  on  what  is 
called by CGC as the pillars: 
(a)  Capacity equalization:  Equalization is about equalizing the fiscal 
capacity of state governments and not their performance. States 
need  not  follow  any  particular  policy  on  either  side  on  their 
budget- a feature available to them due to the untied nature of 
the funds. 
(b)  Internal  standards-  what  states  do:  The  commission  doesn‟t 
make  judgment  about  what  the  appropriate  level  of  service 
should be. It applies an average of those actually applied by the 
states. 
(c)  Policy  neutrality:  A  state‟s  own  policies  or  choices  about  the 
services it provides or the revenue it raises should not directly 
influence the level pf grants it receives. Calculations are based on 
the standard policies in delivering services or raising revenues. 
(2)  Financial  standards:  The  standards  are  the  population  weighted 
averages of the States‟ total expenses or revenues. The standards  
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therefore reflect an average of the experiences and policies of all the 
considered states. They are usually expressed in per capita terms.  
(3)  Equalization  budget:  It  is  the  collection  of  all  the  expense  and 
revenue categories for which the CGC makes assessments. For this 
review it includes only financial transactions that have a direct impact 
on the operating statements of the states. 
(4)  Disabilities: States do not have the same financial capacity to provide 
the  standard  level  of  services.  Differences  in  their  physical  and 
economic  circumstances  and  the  characteristics  of  their  population 
lead to differences in their relative costs of providing services and 
their  relative  revenue  raising  capacities.  These  differences  in  state 
circumstances – which are beyond the control of an individual state 
government-are called “disabilities”. By assessing disabilities the fact 
that the cost of providing services and the ability to raise revenue 
from state taxes and charges vary from state to state is recognized.  
      There are two types of disabilities which the states can face: 
(a)  Use disability: They reflect the differences between States in the 
use  of  services  as  a  result  of  things  such  as  population 
characteristics and the availability of private services. 
(b)   Cost disabilities: These are influences that affect the cost per 
unit  of  service  provided  to  particular  (identifiable)  groups  of 
people or places. For example, higher costs might  be incurred 
when  providing  certain  services  in  remote  or  dispersed  areas.  
Cultural  and  communication  factors  can  increase  the  cost  of 
providing  some  services  to  people  from  culturally  and 
linguistically  diverse  backgrounds.  Some  cost  disabilities  arise 
due to variation in inter-state prices as also due to diseconomies 
of scale. 
(5)  Per capita relativity: The measure of the relative per capita need of 
each State for assistance  that, together with the revenue  from its 
taxes and charges, would give it the financial capacity to provide the 
national  average  standard  of  government  services.  The  relativities  
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are expressed as ratios of an Australian average of one. A relativity 
below  one  indicates  that  a  state  requires  less  than  an  equal  per 
capita share of the total pool. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATES 
 
The  proposed  methodology  is  framed  on  the  broad  outlines  of  the 
Australian  horizontal  fiscal  transfer  system.  The  main  idea  which  it 
borrows is the two-sided equalization approach. The method has been 
adapted to Indian needs, keeping in mind the data constraints and the 
differences in circumstances in the two countries, by considering a macro 
base  for  revenue  side  equalization  while  focusing  on  expenditure 
equalization in respect of select services with restricted mobility. 
 
The first step involves the preparation of a standard budget. The 
standard budget is comprised of the averages of all states in revenue as 
well as in expenditure. No exogenous target is considered.  
 
All  revenue  and  expenditure  categories  are  brought  under  the 
equalization  budget.  The  per  capita  expense  for  each  service  that  the 
state would incur if it were to provide the Australian average standard of 
service is calculated. On the revenue side, the per capita revenue each 
state would raise if it applied the average revenue effort to its revenue 
base  is  calculated.  Expenditure  assessment  adjusts  the  standard 
expenses to allow for the effects of disabilities. 
 
Revenue Side Equalization: Objective: Revenue equalization requires 
determining the tax revenue in per capita terms that the states would 
raise if they applied the same effort on their tax bases for which per 
capita GSDP would be used as a proxy. The tax may also be affected by 
the  composition  of  GSDP  between  agricultural  and  non-agricultural 
shares of GSDP. Literacy rate may also affect tax performance and tax  
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compliance.  The  lack  of  reliable  data,  in  the  case  of  own  non-tax 
revenue, dissuades its inclusion in the exercise. 
 
It involves determining transfers equal to the shortfall of a state‟s 
normatively determined per capita revenue and the benchmark per capita 
revenue which may be with reference to highest or average of selected 
high  tax  base  states  on  which  the  average  tax  effort  is  applied.  Any 
revenue  disability  beyond  the  control  of  the  state  may  need  to  be 
neutralized.  Some  factors  affecting  revenue  and  cost  disabilities  are 
shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Some Factors Affecting Revenue and Cost Disabilities 
Revenue Base  Factors Affecting Expenditure 
 Literacy 
 Composition of GSDP 
 Proportion  of  tribal 
population 
  Density of population 
  Degree of urbanization 
  Proportion of population in age group  6-14 
  Proportion  of  population  aged  65  and 
above 
  Nature of terrain 
  Relative length of arterial roads 
 
Expenditure Side Equalization: Since only selected services would be 
used, first the average share of allocation for each service will have to be 
determined and applied to the normatively determined own tax revenues. 
This will give total normatively determined availability of own tax revenue 
for the given service. On the other side, the normatively determined need 
will be worked out taking into account cost disabilities in providing the 
relevant service. The gap between the need and own-resource for each 
service will be the recommended transfers. The services being considered 
are  –  education  and  health.  We  avoid  the  other  services  because 
including them would magnify the amount of transfers required beyond 
what is actually available. Some of the factors which affect the revenue 




  A mathematical presentation of the equalization methodology can 
be provided, using symbols defined as below: 
ei = standardized per capita expenditure of state i;  i = expenditure 
disability of state i 
ri = standardized per capita revenue of state i;  i = revenue disability 
of state i 
oi = per capita transfer from various central schemes to state i; 
ds = per capita budget surplus; di = ds for all states 
Ni = population of state i; ∑Ni = population of all states 
Subscript„s‟  indicates  corresponding  numbers  for  the  all-state 
averages. 
 
The per capita all-state average grant is given by 
gs = es- rs + ds – os                                   …(1) 
 
The per capita grant to state i is given by 
gi = ei– ri + di – oi                                                                                                    …(2) 
 
Here, ei and ri refer to standardized expenditure and revenue for 
state i, di is the standard budget surplus, which is common for all states 
and  oi  is  the  given  transfer  from  various  central  schemes.  All 
standardizations are made in relation to corresponding all-state averages 
which provides the standard, and the relevant expenditure and revenue 
terms can be written as 
ei =  i es, ri=  i rs                                                                   …(3) 
 
The  standard  expense  per  capita  is  the  total  expenses  of  all 
considered states divided by their total population i.e. 
      es  = ∑ Ei / ∑ Ni 
where,  Ei = expense of state i.  
Similarly the standard revenue per capita is  
  rs  = ∑ Ri / ∑ Ni  
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where,  Ri = revenue of state i. 
 
For a given state the standardized expenditure and revenue will 
be the summation of standardized expenditures on different categories 
and standardized revenues from different sources. The central scheme 
transfers are considered exogenously determined. First the total grants 
are determined and then the untied grants are arrived at by deducting 
the  central  scheme  transfers  (oi)  that  are  treated  by  inclusion.  Grants 
inclusive of the central scheme transfers may be written as g* and per 
capita untied grants as g, where 
       gi* = gi  + oi                                                                        …(4) 
 
The procedure will involve setting up 3 panel equations for tax 
revenue, education and health.  
 
Application to India: Estimation and Results 
Two  methods  are  being  deployed  to  arrive  at  the  transfers.  The  first 
method is based on the Canadian model where only the revenue side 
disabilities  are  compensated.  On  the  other  hand,  the  second  method 
(Australian system) involves estimating the transfers by allowing for both 
revenue  and  expenditure  side  disabilities.  Though  the  methodology 
involves calculating transfers for all services with limited mobility, in this 
paper,  subject  to  data  constraints,  the  transfers  for  only  two  services 
have been calculated- health and education. 
 
From Table 3, it can be seen that the minimum to maximum ratio 
of  the  relative  (to  standard  state)  per  capita  education  expenditure 
calculated  over  2002-2005  for  each  state  is  0.364.  A  similar  ratio  for 
health  is  0.25.  Bihar  has  the  lowest  value  in  case  of  both  health  and 
education.  While  Punjab  has  the  highest  value  for  health  with  1.699, 





Table 3: Relative Per Capita Figures for GSDP, Health 
Expenditure and Education Expenditure Averaged over 2002-05 
State  GSDP  Health  Education 
Bihar  0.306  0.434  0.591 
Uttar P  0.604  0.685  0.633 
Orissa  0.675  0.910  0.845 
Assam  0.713  0.767  1.307 
Madhya P  0.723  0.787  0.621 
Rajasthan  0.819  1.117  1.036 
West Bengal  1.096  1.115  0.956 
Andhra P  1.149  1.180  0.940 
Karnataka  1.188  1.168  1.174 
Tamil Nadu  1.312  1.276  1.153 
Kerala  1.352  1.734  1.615 
Gujarat  1.495  1.173  1.214 
Punjab  1.576  1.699  1.410 
Maharashtra  1.620  1.187  1.622 
Haryana  1.644  1.048  1.186 
Min/max  0.186  0.250  0.364 
Min/average  0.282  0.400  0.544 
Source (Basic Data): Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission 
Key: GSDP=Gross State Domestic Product, Education=educational expenditure,      
        Health= health expenditure. 
 
Revenue Side Equalization: Canadian Approach 
This  system  of  horizontal  equalization  takes  care  of  revenue  side 
equalization.  
 
Two ways of calculating the transfers under this system may be 
considered. The first  method involves compensating  the states for the 
lack  of  their  fiscal  capacities  by  keeping  their  tax  efforts  equal.  The 
formula used in this calculation of transfers is as follows:  
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Ti = N  i * A * (h*-hi) 
where,  
A=average tax rate, Ni=the population of state i, Ti=transfers to state i 
h*=benchmark  per  capita  revenue,  hi=own  per  capita  revenue  of 
state i  
 
The  benchmark  per  capita  revenue  is  calculated  by  taking  the 
population weighted average of five selected states. The average tax rate 
is obtained by dividing the total own-tax revenue for all states by the 
total population of all states. 
 
Revenue Side Equalization: A Panel Model Approach 
In  the  second  method  a  panel  model  is  used  where  the  dependent 
variable  is  per  capita  own-tax  revenue  (OTR)  and  the  independent 
variables  are-  literacy  rate  (LIT),  time  (YR),  per  capita  GSDP  (GSDP), 
proportion  of  urban  population  (URB)  and  share  of  manufacturing  in 
GSDP (MNF). The estimated model is given below: 
 
ln(OTR) = -0.359 + 0.066 * (YR) + 0.781 * ln(LIT) + 0.196 * ln(GSDP) 
+ 0.142 * ln(MNF) + 0.453 * (URB) 
 
It  is  a  one-way  random  effect  model  with  R-squared  value  of 
94.59%.  All  the  variables  in  the  equation  have  expected  signs.  The 
disabilities  of  the  states  are  captured  by  the  various  independent 
variables of the equation. The data for the variables- LIT, URB AND MNF 
has been obtained by interpolation using the census values of 1991 and 
2001. Several other variables like- road density, SC/ST proportion in total 
population,  per  capita  total  transfer,  ratio  of  revenue  deficit  to  fiscal 
deficit, area under forest etc, were tested for significance but were found 
to be insignificant. Also, as one would expect, share of agriculture and 
service sector in GSDP were found to be insignificant in the determination 




From the model the estimated per capita own-tax revenue for 
the  states  are  obtained.  The  next  step  involves  the  calculation  of  the 
estimated  benchmark  per  capita  own-tax  revenue.  The  paper  has 
suggested two approaches for calculating the benchmark per capita own-
tax revenue-  
(a)  Taking the population-weighted average of estimated per capita 
own-tax revenue of all states for each year.  
(b)  Taking the population-weighted average of the first five highest 
estimated per capita own-tax revenues for each year. 
 
The per capita transfers are then determined by the excess of 
the  benchmark  estimated  per  capita  own-tax  revenue  over  the  state‟s 
estimated  per  capita  own-tax  revenue.  It  is  then  multiplied  with 
population to arrive at the total transfers. 
 
Expenditure Side Equalization: Selected Services 
In  the  Australian  approach,  horizontal  fiscal  equalization  looks  at  both 
revenue and expenditure sides. This ensures equalizing the fiscal capacity 
as well as the efficiency across states. 
 
Here, along with the panel data model for per capita own-tax 
revenue, used in the Canadian model, two additional panel data models 
for- per capita education expenditure and per capita health expenditure- 
are  used.  These  two  additional  models  calculate  transfers  for  the 
respective expenditures of the states by taking into account their cost 
and use disabilities. 
 
For both the panel models a number of independent variables 
were tested for significance to include as many disabilities as possible. 
The final models arrived at are given below: 





           ln(EDU) = -3.448  + 0.463 * ln(LIT) + 0.799 * ln(GSDP)  +   
            .047 (Yr_dummy) 
(b)  The model with per capita health expenditure as the dependent 
variable:   
            ln(HLTH)  =  -3.139  +  0.609  *  ln(GSDP)  +  0.152  *  ln(TRNFS)  
             + 0.268 * ln(LIT) 
where, 
EDU= per capita educational expenditure,  
HLTH= per capita health expenditure, 
URB= proportion of urban population in the total population, 
TRNFS= per capital total transfers, 
Yr_dummy = indicates whether after year 2000 or before year 2000,  
Variables LIT and GSDP are the same as defined earlier. 
 
Both the above models are two-way random effect models. The 
R-squared value for (a) is 81.14% and for (b) is 83.08%. As mentioned 
in  the  panel  model  for  per  capita  own-tax  revenue,  here  also  the 
independent variables represent the various disabilities of the states. In 
both the equations, the independent variables have the expected signs.  
 
From  the  models  the  estimated  per  capita  health/education 
expenditure  for  the  states  are  obtained.  The  next  step  involves  the 
calculation  of  the  estimated  benchmark  per  capita  health/education 
expenditure. It is computed by taking the population-weighted average 
of  the  first  three  highest  estimated  per  capita  health/education 
expenditure for each year. The per capita transfers are then determined 
by the excess of the estimated benchmark per capita health/education 
expenditure over the state‟s own estimated per capita health/education 
expenditure. It is then multiplied with the population to obtain the total 






Horizontal  Transfer  Projection  for  India:  A  Panel  Data 
Approach 
The paper presents an alternative way of projecting the central transfers 
to the states. For projections, we use the same panel data model as has 
been described in the above sub-section. The projection period is 2006-
07 to 2009-10. 
 
Certain assumptions which have been made for the projections are: 
(a)  The  high  income  states  do  not  get  any  transfers  in  the  panel 
model. Therefore, an exogenous per capita amount equal to the 
Maharashtra‟s  (highest  income  state)  per  capita  transfers 
recommended by TFC is given to all states. Other options can 
also be used. This may be taken as an illustrative exercise. 
(b) For projecting the total transfer series it has been divided into 
two  components.  One  part  is  composed  of  the  TFC 
recommended transfers while the second consists of the other 
(non-FC) transfers to the states from the centre. The projected 
data for first part was taken from TFC. For the second part, a 
nominal growth rate of 12 percent was assumed. The TFC has 
used a GDP growth rate of 12 percent. Using a growth rate of 12 
percent implies that variables remain constant as a proportion of 
GDP. 
(c)  GSDP for the states has been projected by assuming the growth 
rates as has been calculated by the TFC. The growth rates are as 
follows:- Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar,   Kerala,  Punjab 
and Orissa- 11 percent; Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Uttar 
Pradesh-  12  percent  and;  Gujarat,  Haryana,  Karnataka, 
Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal- 12.8 percent. 
(d) Income from manufacturing has been projected forward. 




Table 4: Comparing Total Transfers Suggested by the Panel Model 
with TFC Recommended Transfers Averaged Over 2006-10 
              (Rs. crore) 
 States    TFC       Model 1         Model 2 
Andhra Pradesh  9,595  7,300  17,819 
Assam  4,220  4,585  8,346 
Bihar  18,768  30,492  46,320 
Gujarat  4,655  4,047  5,682 
Haryana  1,402  1,729  2,987 
Karnataka  5,816  4,110  8,910 
Kerala  3,476  2,417  5,288 
Madhya Pradesh  12,215  12,024  23,790 
Maharashtra  6,518  7,717  7,717 
Punjab  1,694  1,920  2,972 
Orissa  6,732  6,129  11,195 
Rajasthan  7,316  8,657  16,912 
Tamil Nadu  6,920  4,716  4,716 
Uttar Pradesh  26,352  32,323  57,884 
West Bengal  9,205  6,836  17,945 
Total  124,883  135,000  238,483 
Source: (Basic Data): TFC and Census India. 
Key:  Model  1-  benchmark  as  all  states‟  average,  Model  2  –  benchmark  as 
average of highest five own-tax revenues. 
 
Projection for Total Transfers 
Using  the  own-tax  revenue  model  we  calculate  the  fiscal  capacity 
equalization transfers to states. Maharashtra was seen as being the state 
with the highest per capita own tax revenue. Therefore, for the purpose 
of  vertical  transfers  the  per  capita  amount  equal  to  the  per  capita 
transfers to Maharashtra recommended by TFC was given to  all states 
exogenously. Table 4 compares the transfers obtained using the different 
benchmarks, mentioned earlier, with the TFC recommended transfers.  
 
From Table 5, it can be seen that the panel data model gives 
more progressive transfers than the methods it is being compared with. 
High income states get lower amount of transfers under the panel data  
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model as compared to the two methods. 
 
Table 5:  Transfers Suggested By Panel Model Averaged Over 
2006-09 
                (Rs. crore) 
 States     Education          Health 
Uttar Pradesh  17,137            2,819  
Bihar   12,633            2,143  
Madhya Pradesh  6,608            1,041  
Rajasthan  4,690              749  
Andhra Pradesh  3,824              534  
West Bengal  3,617              552  
Orissa  2,880              411  
Karnataka  2,161              272  
Assam  2,037              272  
Tamil Nadu   1,429              165  
Gujarat  851              110  
Kerala  223                25  
Punjab  79                  -    
Haryana  -                    5  
Maharashtra         -                  98  
Total  58,169            9,196  
    Source: (Basic Data): TFC and Census India. 
 
Projection for Transfers:  Selected Services 
For projecting the transfers for the two services considered in the study- 
education and health- the models (a) and (b) are used respectively for 
education  and  health.  The  same  steps  are  followed  as  were  earlier 
described. Bihar gets the highest per capita transfers for both education 
and  health  expenditure.  Table  5  gives  the  transfers  for  health  and 
education expenditure to the states as estimated by the panel model. 
The lowest income states get the highest amounts. Uttar Pradesh gets 






There  are  wide  income  disparities  across  states  in  India.  This  paper 
attempts  to  provide  an  alternative  methodology  to  calculate  the 
horizontal equalization transfers, than the method used by the TFC and 
the other bodies responsible for determining transfers. The paper follows 
the approach of the Australian horizontal equalization methodology but 
uses a panel model methodology which looks at both the revenue as well 
as  the  selected  services  on  expenditure  side  while  determining  the 
transfers compensating the states for the various use and cost disabilities 
they face. The paper has also presented the application of -the Canadian 
model of transfers, which looks only at the revenue side equalization, and 
the Australian system of transfers- for India and compared the results 
with the transfers recommended by TFC and other methods. Since the 
paper concerns itself more with the  horizontal distribution of transfers 
rather than the vertical, while comparing the transfers, the transfers have 
been  adjusted  so  that  the  total  transfers  obtained  from  the  model 
remains  equal  to  those  in  to  those  in  other  methods.  The  Australian 
model  has  been  modified  during  the  application  keeping  in  mind  the 
differences in conditions in India and the data constraints. 
 
This  paper  has  presented  estimation  for  equalization  transfers 
consisting  of  two  components.  The  first  is  limited  to  fiscal  capacity 
equalization following a Canadian type approach but using a set of macro 
determinants in a panel model framework.   This is supplemented by 
equalization exercises for education and health. In the case of capacity 
equalization, states are put at average tax effort using a one way random 
effect  model.  The  benchmark  was  set  at  15-state  average  per  capita 
own-tax  revenue  (model  1)  and  alternatively  at  the  highest  5-state 
average for per capita own-tax revenue.  
 
The expenditure side equalization has been carried out for two 
services  with  limited  mobility-  education  and  health.  A  panel  data  
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approach  was  used.  The  benchmarks  in  these  cases  were  set  at  the 
average  of  the  highest  three  per  capita  expenditures  on  the  relevant 
services.   
 
The  paper  has  exhibited  that  the  transfers  suggested  by  the 
panel model are more progressive than the TFC recommended transfers. 
The  model  does  not  compensate  the  states  for  their  low  tax  efforts, 





Table A1:  Transfers Suggested By TFC Over 2006-09 
              (Rs. crore) 
States 
TFC Recommended 
2006-07  2007-08  2008-09  2009-10 
Andhra Pradesh  8812  9960  11298  12861 
Assam  4207  4749  5378  6111 
Bihar   15434  17418  19545  22008 
Gujarat  4531  5091  5744  6505 
Haryana  1431  1602  1800  2032 
Karnataka  5586  6278  7086  8029 
Kerala  3405  3819  4302  4867 
Madhya Pradesh  11306  12770  14477  16471 
Maharashtra  6413  7192  8100  9162 
Punjab  2666  2602  2189  2469 
Orissa  6442  7255  8201  9306 
Rajasthan  6846  7728  8754  9953 
Tamil Nadu   6458  7284  8247  9373 
Uttar Pradesh  25596  28893  32552  36800 
West Bengal  8957  9451  10735  12234 
Total  118090  132092  148410  168180 
Source (Basic Data): Report of Twelfth Finance Commission. 
Table A2:  Transfers Suggested By Model 1 Over 2006-09 
              (Rs. crore) 
 
Model 1 Recommended 
2006-07  2007-08  2008-09  2009-10 
Andhra Pradesh  6033  6906  7684  8580 
Assam  3853  4308  4805  5373 
Bihar   24861  28361  32188  36558 
Gujarat  3364  3773  4248  4802 
Haryana  1429  1608  1817  2061 
Karnataka  3435  3839  4308  4855 
Kerala  2048  2258  2526  2837 
Madhya Pradesh  10096  11170  12596  14233 
Maharashtra  6413  7192  8100  9162 
Punjab  1636  1782  2002  2259 
Orissa  5022  5796  6466  7230 
Rajasthan  7388  8145  9043  10053 
Tamil Nadu   3968  4417  4938  5542 
Uttar Pradesh  26580  30170  34049  38494 
West Bengal  5867  6353  7118  8006 
Total  111993  126077  141886  160043 




Table A3:  Transfers Suggested By Model 2 Over 2006-09 
              (Rs. crore) 
States 
Model 2 Recommended 
2006-07  2007-08  2008-09  2009-10 
Andhra Pradesh  14703  16754  18768  21053 
Assam  6938  7822  8773  9852 
Bihar   37799  43133  48897  55452 
Gujarat  4619  5217  5992  6900 
Haryana  2463  2838  3149  3500 
Karnataka  7477  8308  9337  10516 
Kerala  4335  4784  5563  6469 
Madhya Pradesh  19692  22141  25022  28306 
Maharashtra  6413  7192  8100  9162 
Punjab  2797  2724  3017  3349 
Orissa  9212  10537  11800  13231 
Rajasthan  14108  15835  17765  19941 
Tamil Nadu   3968  4417  4938  5542 
Uttar Pradesh  47358  53966  61061  69150 
West Bengal  15023  16754  18824  21178 
Total  196905  222422  251006  283600 
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